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Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for
predicting human behavior in interactive situations.  By relaxing the classical assumptions of
perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of (i) initial
decisions, (ii) dynamic patterns of learning and adjustment, and (iii) equilibrium steady-state
distributions.
Introduction
About fifty years ago, John Nash walked into the office of the Chair of the Princeton Mathematics
Department with a solution concept for N-person games, along with an existence proof that was
soon published in these Proceedings [1].  John von Neumann was dismissive and remarked "that's
trivial, you know.  That's just a fixed point theorem" [2].  But word of Nash's theorem spread
quickly at RAND on the West Coast, where researchers working on defense strategy were
dissatisfied with the received theory of zero-sum games, since the assumption that one player's
gain is another's loss is of limited relevance beyond simple card games.  Two mathematicians,
Dresher and Flood, designed a laboratory experiment to test Nash's equilibrium concept the same
day they heard about his proof.  Their experiment implemented a game in which two players have
unilateral incentives to "defect" even though both are better off when both "cooperate."  Nash's
thesis advisor, Tucker, later saw the payoffs for this experiment on the blackboard in someone's
office and devised the famous story of the "prisoner's dilemma," which he used in a seminar for
the Psychology Department at Stanford University [3].  
The applications of game theory have expanded greatly since then, and with the Nash
equilibrium as its centerpiece, game theory has finally gained the central role first envisioned by
von Neumann and Morgenstern [4].  If anything, game theory is the leading contender for2
becoming a general theory of social science, with extensive applications in economics, political
science, psychology, law, and biology.  Indeed, in some areas of economics virtually all recent
theoretical developments are applications of game theory.
There is, however, widespread criticism of theories based on the classical "rational choice"
assumptions of perfect decision making (no errors) and perfect foresight (no surprises), especially
when they are applied to describe behavior in complex interactive situations.  This skepticism is
reinforced by evidence from laboratory experiments with financially-motivated subjects which
often produce behavior patterns that are systematically biased away from rational choice
predictions.  Nash himself participated in experiments as a subject and later designed experiments
of his own, but he and his coauthors lost whatever confidence they had in game theory when they
saw how poorly it predicted actual behavior [2].  And Reinhard Selten, who shared the 1995
Economics Nobel Prize (with Nash and Harsanyi), remarked that "game theory is for doing
theory, not for playing games."  Like many others, he has argued that decisions are stochastic or
"noisy," where the noise in subjects' behavior may be due to errors in perception, calculation, or
recording decisions [5].  Alternatively, apparent noise may represent fully rational responses to
factors like benevolence, envy, or other idiosyncratic factors that are not measured by the
experimenter [6].  Regardless of the source and interpretation of the noise, the effect will be that
different players encounter different histories of others' play, and learning in such environments
may lead to variations in individuals' beliefs and decisions.  This paper describes three new
developments in game theory that relax the classical assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect
foresight.  These approaches to noisy introspection (prior to play), learning (from previous plays),
and equilibrium (after a large number of plays) provide complementary perspectives for explaining
actual behavior in a wide variety of games.  
Coordination and Social Dilemma Games
The models summarized here have been strongly influenced by data from experiments that show
disturbing differences between game-theoretic predictions and behavior of human subjects who
are earning money in controlled strategic situations.  For example, Goeree and Holt [7] show that
all the standard types of games can be implemented in a manner that yields predictions consistent3
with the Nash equilibrium for some parameter values, and yet in each case the observed data will
shift dramatically in response to a payoff change that does not alter the Nash prediction.  Similar
anomalous results have been reported in many other experiments, e.g., matching pennies games,
centipede games, two-stage games, market pricing games, and bargaining games [8-12].  We will
present the main argument of a social dilemma game for which Nash's theory predicts a unique
equilibrium that is "bad" for all concerned, and a coordination game in which any common effort
level is an equilibrium, i.e. the Nash equilibrium makes no prediction at all. 
The social dilemma is based on a story in which two travelers lose luggage with identical
contents, and the airline official promises to pay any claim in an acceptable range as long as the
claims are equal.  If not, the person making the higher claim is assumed to have lied, and both
will be reimbursed at the lower claim, with a reward, R > 1, being deducted from the
reimbursement to the high claimant and given to the low claimant.  A Nash equilibrium in this
context is a pair of claims that survives an "announcement test:" if each person writes in their
claim and then announces it as they turn in their claim sheet, neither should want to reconsider.
Since the travelers file their claims separately, each will have a temptation to "undercut" any
agreed on common claim.  For example, suppose the range of acceptable claims is from 80 to
200, with a reward parameter, R, equal to 10.  A common claim of 200 yields 200 for both, but
a deviation by one person to 199 would profitably raise that person's payoff to 199 + 10.  The
incentive to undercut the other's decision by 1 implies that the maximum claim of 200 is never
an optimal choice, irrespective of the beliefs one has about the other's claim choice.
Consequently, a rational person must assign zero probability to a choice of 200.  But once 200 is
ruled out as a possibility, 199 can be ruled out on the same grounds, and this logic can be repeated
until the only beliefs rational players can have are that claims will be 80.  In fact, 80 is the unique
Nash equilibrium, despite the fact that both would be better off by claiming a high amount.
The paradoxical outcome of this "traveler's dilemma" game was first derived by Basu  [3].
He did not expect behavior to converge to the Nash prediction for low values of R, but as he
noted, none of the standard modifications of game theory can predict this anticipated deviation.
Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt [14] conducted an experiment based on this game form, using







periods.  Earnings ranged from $24 to $44 and were paid in private, immediately after the
experiment.  With R = 50, the average claim was quite close the Nash prediction of 80 in the
final 5 rounds, but with R = 10, the average claim started high (at about 180) and moved away
from the Nash prediction, ending up at 186 for the last five rounds.  The frequency of actual
decisions for the final five rounds is indicated in figure 1 by the blue bars for R = 50 and by the
red bars for R = 10.  The yellow bars show the frequency of decisions for an intermediate
treatment with R = 25.  The task for theory is to explain these treatment differences, which
sharply contrast the Nash prediction of 80, independent of R.
Figure 1. Claims in a Traveler’s Dilemma with R = 50 (blue), R = 25 (yellow), and R = 10
(red).
The second game has a similar structure, with payoffs again being determined by the
minimum of the two players' decisions.  In this game, the decisions are "effort levels," and the
joint production process is such that it requires both players to perform a costly task in order to5
raise the level of production.  The payoff for each player is the minimum of the two efforts, minus
the cost of the player's own effort: B = min{x , x } - cx, where x is player i's effort level and i    1   2     i     i
c < 1 is a cost parameter.  Just as in the traveler's dilemma, both players would be better off if
they could coordinate on high decisions.  The difference is that in a coordination game such a
high-effort outcome is an equilibrium.  Indeed, consider a common effort level, and notice that
a unilateral increase is costly but does not affect the minimum.  Similarly, a unilateral decrease
from any common effort level will reduce the minimum by more than the cost saving, since
c < 1.  Hence, any common effort level would survive the Nash announcement test, so the
maximum effort is an equilibrium, as is any other level.  
While a low effort cost makes it relatively safe to choose a high effort, a high cost makes
this action risky as it may not be matched by the other player, which suggests that actual behavior
might be sensitive to changes in the cost parameter.  Goeree and Holt [15] report an experiment
with randomly matched pairs of subjects who made effort choices in the range from 110 to 170
(pennies).  With a relatively low effort cost of c = .25, efforts tended to be in the upper part of
this range, and with a high effort cost of c = .75, the data pattern was reversed.  The time-
sequences of average effort choices for three groups of 10 subjects in each treatment are shown
in figure 2, with an upward pattern for the low-effort cost treatment (thin blue lines) and an
essentially symmetric downward adjustment for the high-effort cost treatment (thin green lines).
The thick blue and green lines show average efforts for each treatment (the red lines are discussed
below).  The strong treatment effect, which is consistent with simple intuition about the effects
of effort costs, is not predicted by the Nash equilibrium or any standard variant of it.  Another
interesting result of the experiment is that subjects may "get stuck" in a low-effort equilibrium,
even though there is there is a high-effort outcome that is not only better for all concerned, but
it is also a Nash equilibrium [16-17].
To summarize, experimental data for both games reveal that the most salient feature of
observed behavior is not predicted by classical game theory, where the assumption is that the
decision with the highest expected payoff will invariably be chosen, no matter how small the
payoff difference.  In practice, players are usually unsure about what others will do, and there













In the coordination game with a low cost, for example, the potential losses from "overshooting"
an optimal decision are much less than from "undershooting."  Thus any noise in the decision
making process might lead players to raise their effort decisions, which can further raise the
payoffs associated with higher decisions.  In an interactive, strategic situation, this process can
"snowball" leading to a large increase in decisions.  Even relatively small payoff asymmetries and
small amounts of noise can have a large effect in an interactive, strategic game in which these
effects are compounded endogenously, and this intuition is a key element of the static and dynamic
theories presented in the next two sections.
Figure 2.  A Coordination Game: Data Averages (blue and green lines) and Evolutionary
Predictions (red lines).
Evolutionary Dynamics
A natural approach to explaining divergent adjustment patterns like those in figure 2 is to develop
models of evolution and learning.  The idea behind evolution in this context is not based on the
biological notion of reproductive fitness, but rather that people tend to adopt strategies that haveMF(x,t)
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worked well in the past.  Besides incorporating payoff-seeking behavior, evolutionary models
typically add in some stochastic elements that are reminiscent of mutation in biological models.
For example, Anderson, Goeree, and Holt [18] present a model that has its roots in statistical
physics and that can be seen as quantification of "learning direction theory" [19].  Individuals
drawn from a population of players are characterized by their decision, x(t), at time t, which earns
an expected payoff of B (x(t),t) where the expectation is taken with respect to the current
e
population distribution of decisions, F(x,t).  The evolutionary assumption is that a player's
decision tends to increase if the expected payoff function is increasing at x(t), and vice versa.  So
the decisions evolve over time, with the rate of change proportional to the slope of expected
payoff, B ´, plus a stochastic Brownian motion term: dx = B ´(x(t),t)dt + µ dw(t), with µ an
e                   e
error parameter that determines the relative importance of the random shock dw(t).  Techniques
from classical physics can be used to show that this stochastic adjustment process translates into
the following differential equation for the population distribution:
where f and f´ represent the population density and its slope.  This is the famous Fokker-Planck
equation which is derived in this interactive context in [18].  The intuition for the two terms on
the right side of (1) is that, when payoffs are increasing, probability mass will move the right
(lowering F), and when the density is increasing, the effect of noise is to "flatten" the density
pushing probability mass to the left (raising F).  
The expected payoff function in (1) depends on the distribution of decisions, so the
evolutionary process in (1) is in general a non-linear partial differential equation and much more
complex than it first appears.  Nevertheless, we can solve for the time paths of the distribution
function numerically, given an initial distribution of efforts.  The red lines in figure 2 show the
trajectories of average efforts for the two treatments of the coordination game experiment.  This
model explains both the strong treatment effect and the general qualitative features of the










Evolutionary models, when used to describe laboratory data, are sometimes criticized on
the grounds that they ignore the cognitive abilities of human subjects.  This critique is less severe
than it seems at first, as a number of researchers have pointed out the close connections between
standard replicator models of biological evolution and more cognitive learning models.  The
learning model that is closest to the evolutionary approach is "reinforcement learning" based on
the psychological insight that successful strategies will be reinforced and used more frequently.
Roth and Erev [12, 28] formalize these insights by giving each decision an initial weight, and then
adding the payoff actually obtained for a decision chosen to the weight for that decision.  The
model is stochastic in the sense that the probability that a decision is taken is the ratio of its own
weight to the sum of all weights.  Simulations show that reinforcement learning models explain
key features of data from many economics experiments [28].
Alternatively, learning can be modeled in terms of beliefs about others' decisions.  For
example, suppose that beliefs are characterized by a weight for each possible value of the other
player's decision, and that the subjective probability associated with each decision is its weight
divided by the sum of all weights.  If the Bayesian prior distribution over decisions is Dirichlet
and the generating process is thought to be multinomial, then the posterior is Dirichlet with the
updated weights determined by adding 1 to the weight of the decision that was observed while the
other weights are unaltered.  The resulting subjective probabilities determine expected payoffs,
which in turn determine players' choice probabilities.  To allow for some randomness in decision
making, a probabilistic choice rule can be used to inject some noise into the system.  These rules
have the property that a decision with a higher expected payoff is more likely to be chosen
although not necessarily with probability one.  For instance, the familiar "logit" form that is
widely used in empirical work assumes that the probability of selecting a particular decision, i,
is an exponential function of its expected payoff, B (i):









where the denominator ensures that the probabilities for the N decisions sum to one, and the error
parameter µ determines how sensitive choice probabilities are to payoff differences.  As µ goes
to infinity, all choice probabilities are equal, regardless of payoff differences, but small payoff
differences will have large effects when µ goes to zero.    
Figure 3.  Adjustment Patterns in the Traveler’s Dilemma: Human Data (thick lines) and
Simulated Bayesian Learning (thick lines), by Color-Coded Treatments.
Computer simulations based on this noisy learning model begin with a specification of
initial beliefs (often uniform), which determine the expected payoffs and choice probabilities in
(2).  Simulated players are matched and see the other player's randomly determined decision,
which is then used to update the weights that determine beliefs, and hence expected payoffs.  Then
a new round of simulated decisions are generated with (2), and the process continues.  Figure 3
shows computer simulations and actual human data for groups of ten randomly matched players
in the three treatments of the traveler's dilemma game.  Simulations of this type have also been10
used to explain adjustment patterns in experiments based on signaling games [29], coordination
games [15], and a price competition game [11].  At this time, there is no consensus about which
dynamic model is best, and the work of Camerer and Ho [30] suggests that a hybrid formulation
might provide the best fits to laboratory data.  See [31] for a survey.
Logit Equilibrium
In a steady state, the distribution function in (1) stops evolving, i.e., dF/dt = 0.  Setting
the right side of (1) to zero, dropping the time arguments, and rearranging yields a differential
equation in the equilibrium density: f´(x)/f(x) = B ´(x) /µ.  This equation can be integrated to
e  
yield f(x) = k exp(B (x)/µ) which is the continuous analogue of (2).  Thus a gradient-based
e
evolutionary model with Brownian motion produces the logit model in a steady state.  Likewise,
when simulated behavior in learning models with logit errors settles down, the steady state
distributions of decisions are consistent with the logit rule in (2).
In equilibrium, condition (2) must be interpreted carefully, since the choice density
determines the expected payoffs, which in turn determine the choice density.  In other words, the
logit equilibrium is a fixed point: the "belief" density that goes into the expected payoff function
on the right side of (2) must match the "choice" density that comes out of the logit rule on the left
side.  McKelvey and Palfrey [32-33] prove that such a fixed point exists for all games with a finite
number of decisions.  While the logit form is computationally convenient, it is possible to use
other probabilistic choice rules [34-35], and McKelvey and Palfrey's proof covers the general
case.  Their elegant proof is based on a fixed-point theorem, like Nash's half-page Nobel Prize
winning proof that was published in these Proceedings. 
The equilibrium conditions in (2) can be solved numerically using an error parameter that
is estimated from the data using standard maximum likelihood methods.  Figure 4 shows the logit
equilibrium densities for the treatments of the traveler's dilemma game.  Note that the theoretical
densities pick up the general location of the data frequencies in figure 1, with the colors used to
match predictions and data for each treatment.  There are certainly discrepancies, such as the
underprediction of claims in the intermediate R = 25 treatment, but the logit equilibrium









reward parameter R.  The logit equilibrium has been succesfully applied to explain behavior in
a variety of environments including coordination games, signaling games, abstract matrix games,
public goods games, jury decision making, and rent-seeking contests [32-33, 36-39]. 
Figure 4.  Logit Equilibrium Densities for the Traveler’s Dilemma with R = 50 (blue), R = 25
(yellow), and R = 10 (red).
A Model of Iterated Noisy Introspection
We have discussed learning and equilibrium in the previous two sections, but these techniques will
not work when there is no opportunity for players to learn, adjust strategies, and reach anp ’ lim
n64
Nµ(Ntµ(@ @ @ Nt nµ(q))).
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(3)
equilibrium.  "One-shot" games are particularly appropriate for modeling many political contests,
legal disputes, special auctions, or other strategic situations that are not repeated.    
The only way to try to avoid surprises in these situations is to use general intuition and
introspection about what the other player(s) might do, what they think others might do, etc.
Edgar Allen Poe mentions this type of iterated introspection in an account of a police inspector
trying to decide where to search for the "purloined letter."  Keynes [40] describes iterated
introspection in the context of investors who want to purchase stocks that others will decide to
purchase subsequently, because they think others will purchase, etc., causing the price to
appreciate.  Economists have long thought about such iterated expectations, and have noted that
the resulting "infinite regress" often leads to a Nash equilibrium, and hence is of limited relevance
in describing a new approach to behavior in games played only once.  
Naturally, our approach is to introduce noise into the introspective process, with the
intuition that players' own decisions involve less noise than their perceptions of others' decisions,
which in turn involves less noise than other players' perceptions of others' decisions, etc.  Our
model is based on the probabilistic choice mapping in (2), which we will express compactly as p
= N (q), where q represents the vector of belief probabilities that determine expected payoffs, and µ
p is the vector of probabilities that is determined by the probabilistic choice rule N  with error µ
parameter µ.  We will assume that the noise parameter associated with each higher level of iterated
introspection is t > 1 times the error parameter associated with the lower level.  For instance, p
= N (N (q)) represents a player's noisy (µ) response to the other player's noisy (tµ) response to µ t µ
beliefs q.  The "telescope" parameter t determines how fast the error rate blows up with further
iterations; the error rate for the nth iteration is given by t µ.  We are interested in the choice
n-1
probabilities in the limit as the number of iterations goes to infinity:
In [41] we use continuity arguments to show that this limit is well defined when t > 1.  Since N4
maps the whole probability simplex to a single point, the process is independent of the initial
belief vector q.  Goeree and Holt [41] show that (3) provides a good explanation of (non-
equilibrium) play in many types of one-shot games; see also [42-43] for alternative approaches.13
The logit equilibrium arises as a limit case of this two parameter introspective model.
Recall that a logit equilibrium is a fixed point of N , i.e. a vector p  that satisfies p  = N (p ), and µ                   µ
*      *    *
note that for t = 1, a fixed point of N  is also a fixed point of (3).  So, if the introspective model µ
converges for t = 1, the result is a logit equilibrium (although, in general, convergence is only
ensured for t > 1).  To summarize, the logit equilibrium generalizes Nash by relaxing the
assumption of perfect decision making, and the introspective model generalizes logit by relaxing
the assumption of perfect consistency between actions and beliefs.
Conclusion
Game theory is the closest thing to a unifying theory in social science, and it evokes some of the
strongest antagonism as well.  Critics argue that people are not perfectly rational, and that the
experimental support for game theory is mixed.  Daniel Kahneman, a noted Princeton
psychologist, remarked in a plenary address: "When an economist says the evidence is mixed, that
means the theory says one thing and the data say something else."  For most economic theorists,
the subtext on this would be that the there must be something wrong with the experiments because
the theory is logically correct.  The problem with this normative defense is that what is optimal
in a game like the traveler's dilemma depends on what the other players actually do, not on what
some theory says they should do.    
This paper describes three complementary modifications of classical game theory.  The
models of introspection, learning/evolution, and equilibrium contain the common stochastic
elements that represent errors or unobserved preference shocks.  These three approaches are like
the "three friends" of classical Chinese gardening (pine, prunus, and bamboo), they fit together
nicely, each with a different purpose.  Models of iterated noisy introspection are used to explain
beliefs and choices in games played only once, where surprises are to be expected, and beliefs are
not likely to be consistent with choices.  With repetition, beliefs and decisions can be revised via
learning or evolution.  Choice distributions will tend to stabilize when there are no more surprises
in the aggregate, and the resulting steady state constitutes a noisy (quantal response) equilibrium.
These theoretical perspectives have allowed us to predict initial play, adjustment patterns,
and final tendencies in a series of laboratory experiments.  Data patterns that our colleagues would14
previously characterize as "behavioral" (i.e., consistent with intuition but not with theory) are
being picked up by these new stochastic game-theoretic models.  There are discrepancies and
surprises, but the overall pattern of results is surprisingly coherent, especially considering that we
are using human subjects in interactive situations.  In fact, the coauthor with a second degree in
physics (Goeree) sometimes remarks that he is getting "that old physics feeling" when something
unexpected happens in an economics experiment.  
Laboratory experiments have been intimately connected with the development of game
theory, starting with the reaction to Nash's seminal theorem that appeared in this journal.  Two
of the three recipients of the first Nobel Prize in Economics given to game theorists (Nash and
Selten) conducted experiments.  Patterns of actual human data provide the landmarks that are
needed to avoid becoming lost in the jungle of possibilities once theorists move away from
assumptions of perfect rationality.  The resulting models have the empirical content that makes
them relevant for playing games, not just for doing theory.
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